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Introduction and Context 
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Unions can leverage worker’s capital through various strategies such as: producer 
cooperatives, worker ownership of shares in their own company, union funds for national or 
regional economic development, and influence on the investment of worker pension and savings 
funds (Wheeler, 2004: 88).  In particular the governance of pension funds has received 
considerable attention in recent years (Northrup, Northrup, Bellante and Raisian, 1981; Johnson, 
Harwood and Heldman, 1981; Ghilarducci, 1992; Quarter, 1995; CUPE, 1996, 2005; 
Carmichael, 1998; Fung, Hebb and Rogers, 2001; Quarter, Carmichael, Sousa and Elgie, 2001).  
The interest in pension funds stems from several factors.  For one, due to their size, pension 
funds can have a powerful impact on financial markets (Drucker, 1976; Deaton, 1989).  
Worldwide pension assets are valued at $11 trillion (Anand, 2000) with a recent Freshfields 
report estimating United States and United Kingdom pension funds at $7.4 trillion (2005).  
Canadian pension assets have been estimated at $600 billion (CLBC, 2002).  Pension funds also 
represent an important opportunity for unions to support the growing movement towards a 
proactive investment strategy that takes into account environmental, social and governance 
issues (Ghilarducci, 1992; Fung, Hebb and Rogers, 2001; Freshfields, 2005).   
In a time of union decline and debate over their relevance, greater activism in pension 
funds may also be a means to union renewal.  Referring to the labor movement in the United 
States, Wheeler (2004) suggests that use of worker capital to influence corporate strategy toward 
socially responsible outcomes may result in much needed positive public relations for unions 
(see also Bennett and Johnson, 1981).  Such a focus also broadens the labor agenda to larger 
social and economic arenas which increases opportunities for visibility and coalition building.  
Participation in governance is also of immediate self-interest to unions because it may provide 
additional security to plan beneficiaries (Quarter, 1995; Quarter, et al. 2001). 
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One important aspect of the labor movement’s involvement in pension funds is the 
appointment of labor or member representatives to pension trustee boards or committees1 
(Carmichael and Quarter, 2003).  In 1998 it was estimated that one-third of all pension assets in 
Canada fell under some form of joint-trusteeship (Falconer, 1999) and that 18 of the top 23 
unions had won or were in the process of winning some form of joint-trusteeship (as cited in 
Carmichael and Quarter, 2003).  Similar moves toward employee representation are occurring in 
other industrialized nations as well.  For example, using survey data from 1990-2000, Hess 
(2005) reported that one-third of the trustees on public pension funds in the United States were 
member-elected (see also Schuller and Hyman, 1983a, 1983b and 1984; Gribben and Faruk, 
2004; Gribben and Olsen, 2002 for studies of the United Kingdom, and Fung, et al., 2001 and 
Wheeler, 2004 for discussions of the United States).   
A key debate in the management of pension fund investment is whether the fiduciary 
mandate stipulates pure profit maximization based only on financial indicators or whether 
financial returns and the best interests of beneficiaries allow or demand the consideration of 
environmental, social and corporate governance issues (Freshfields, 2005).  This latter 
stakeholder perspective acknowledges a firm’s financial obligations to its shareholders, but 
underscores the accompanying obligations to the firm’s other stakeholders: their workers, 
customers, communities and the environment (Clark, 2000; Chapman, 2002; Hebb and Jackson, 
2002).    Despite the growing interest and acceptance of extra-financial investment 
considerations and the increase of labor representation on pension boards of trustees, there is 
mixed support for this approach both in the financial community and the labor movement.  Many 
finance professionals reject and discourage a stakeholder approach to pension investment and 
                                                 
1 Union representatives are also called member representatives, labor trustees, union trustees, plan participant 
representatives and sit on pension boards, committees and advisory committees.  For brevity, we will use labor 
trustees and pension boards to denote all of these possibilities unless otherwise stated. 
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also discount the value of labor trustees at the board table.  Trade unions face several choices in 
pension fund governance: whether to engage in pension governance through labor representation 
at all, whether to maintain the status quo of pension investment through traditional 
interpretations of fiduciary duty, or whether to adopt varying degrees of a stakeholder 
perspective (see Weststar and Verma, forthcoming).   
The premise for this study rests on the assumption that unless unions’ goals for pension 
involvement are clearly articulated and they initiate a process by which they can develop 
requisite leadership, it will be difficult for unions and labor trustees to effectively participate on 
pension boards and achieve strategic goals at any level.  Preliminary studies of labor trustees 
show that they face considerable barriers as they attempt to fulfill their new roles and impact the 
decisions of the pension bodies on which they serve (Schuller and Hyman, 1984; Deaton, 1989; 
Carmichael, 2003).  Exacerbating this, many unions have yet to express a comprehensive and 
proactive policy on their role in pension fund governance.  As indicated above, while some 
unions believe that they must push for greater labor participation in pension issues, others stay 
clear of them.  Others are less clear on a mandate to give to their representative(s) on the pension 
board.  Since their goals in pension governance remain unclear, most unions do not appear to 
have a formal process to identify and develop their own talent in this area.   
Given this environment, this paper seeks to identify the factors that help labor trustees 
become effective pension board members in the Canadian context.  We combine analysis of 
existing literature with data gathered through interviews with labor trustees to develop a model 
that links institutional characteristics of the board and union strategic choices to trustee 
development needs.  We propose that this model can be used to aid the integration, participation 
and overall effectiveness of labor trustees given particular trustee or union strategic goals.  The 
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following section presents a brief overview of the institutional context for pensions that frames 
many of the ideological debates and challenges that face labor trustees.  This context is largely 
described for Canada, however, common law countries such as the United States, United 
Kingdom and Australia have a similar context.  Next, we outline the research method and discuss 
the experiences of labor trustees as exemplified by our interview findings and existing literature.  
Last, we present our model of trustee development and offer implications of our study and 
avenues for future research. 
 
Key Legislation and Associated Debates 
In Canada workers can receive pension income from government-sponsored programs as 
well as employer-sponsored pension plans that are based on employer and employee 
contributions.  Employer-sponsored plans in Canada are quite varied.  Statistics from January, 
2000 show 1,276 plans covering 2.4 million federal, provincial and municipal government 
employees and 14,281 individual or multi-employer plans covering 2.6 million commercial, 
industrial and other private sector workers (as cited in Greenan, 2003).  More recently the 
Certified General Accountants of Canada (CGA-Canada) conducted a study using 847 plans 
from the MERCER Pension Database.  They report that of the 746 plans from this sample that 
operate in the private sector, 42 per cent cover unionized workers.  They did not include a 
breakdown by unionization for the remaining 101 plans deemed non-private sector, but the 
majority of these would assumedly be large public sector plans covering unionized workers 
(CGA-Canada, 2004). 
      With the exception of those employees and industries that fall under jurisdictional 
authority of the federal government (i.e., Crown Corporations, banks, railways and employees in 
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the Yukon, Nunavut and the North West Territories), pension funds fall under provincial 
jurisdiction and specific pension standards legislation.  Two components of the pension 
standards legislation are particularly important for union involvement in pension issues.  The 
guidelines for plan administration impact the composition of the pension Board of Trustees while 
the principles of prudence set the tone for investment strategy.  Though each province has 
separate pension legislation, the clauses regarding pension administration and prudence are 
substantively similar.  This is also the case in other countries with common law jurisdiction (i.e., 
US, UK and Australia).  For example, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 
in the US covers private pension plans and outlines the naming of fiduciaries (section 402) and 
establishes the “prudent man” standard of care (section 404) which is much the same as provided 
in Canadian legislation (Freshfields, 2005; see also BenefitsLink, 2006).   
Pension Administration   
Generally pension standards legislation includes a list of possible plan administrators: the 
employer, a pension committee comprised of employer representatives and/or members of the 
plan, the insurance company guaranteeing the benefits provided under the plan, or a board of 
trustees of either employer or member representatives or both (Greenan, 2003).  Some pension 
plans, particularly those operated and/or sponsored solely by the employer or government also 
include advisory committees as part of their governance structure.  Advocacy for such advisory 
committees is increasing as the concern over pension governance rises (CGA-Canada).  The 
result is a wide array of governance structures across pension funds with and without member or 
labor representation.  A summary of the most common models is presented in Table 1 and 
discussed below.   
 7
      For those unions interested in obtaining representation in pension governance, joint-
trusteeship is the premiere goal and unions such as those associated with the Ontario Public 
Service Employees’ Union Trust (OP Trust), the Hospitals of Ontario Occupational Pension Plan 
(HOOPP) and the Colleges of Applied Arts and Technology (CAAT) Pension Plan have 
achieved the most equal representation and the most direct selection control of their 
representatives (see #2 and #3 in Table 1).  Some unions, primarily those in the building trades 
have a different model, but one that also achieves high levels of control over pension funds.  In 
these industries unions act as the stable force because members work with multiple employers.  
For this reason, the unions have sole trusteeship of pension plans into which the employers 
contribute funds.  A financial consulting firm is typically appointed to administer the plan (see 
#1).  Another model of note is listed as #7 where Quebec legislation stipulates that there be a 
labor or membership representation on the pension committee that administers the plan 
(Greenan, 2003).  In practice this often results in pension committees comprised of two plan 
beneficiaries (one active and one retiree), one member independent of both the employer and the 
beneficiaries, and five management representatives (PTI192).  The Ontario Teacher’s Pension 
Plan (listed as #5) is also worth separate mention as it demonstrates that union representatives 
are not necessarily union members.  In this case, it is not four teachers who sit on the board with 
four employer representatives, but four teacher representatives typically selected from the 
financial community (Ontario Teachers’, 2005).  Some unions, particularly private sector unions 
such as the Canadian Autoworkers’ Union (CAW), show less interest in achieving union 
representation on pension boards (#11) (discussed below).   
Prudence  
                                                 
2 The codes PTI01-PTI20 reference interviews with labour trustees.  See Appendix 1 for a profile of interviewees. 
 8
The notion of prudence is also important for labor trustees and contains two principles: 
the prudent portfolio and the prudent person.  The prudent portfolio stipulates that a given 
investment be analyzed with respect to how it affects the risk and return of the pension portfolio 
as a whole and not as a stand-alone investment.  The prudent person stipulates that the plan 
administrator and its agents “exercise the care, diligence and skill in the investment of the 
pension fund that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with the property of 
another person.” (Greenan, 2003: 200)  Though these principles originated out of the desire to 
instill caution in trustees who generally “carry the responsibility of ownership without the 
ownership itself,” (Carmichael, 2003: 53) traditional interpretations of prudence, or fiduciary 
responsibility, have acted as a barrier to alternative investment and governance models.   
      Traditional models of pension governance focus on rate of return often to the exclusion of 
extra-financial factors such as the environment, corporate ethics or social impact.  As 
representatives of unions, which are social and political actors, labor trustees are in a position to 
support the growing stakeholder perspective on investment (Clark, 2000; Chapman, 2002; Hebb 
and Jackson, 2002) that is not readily accepted or that is rejected outright under narrow 
interpretations of prudence and fiduciary duty.  Counter-arguments are emerging that state that 
fiduciary duty does not preclude pension trustees (labor or otherwise) from investing based 
extra-financial criteria provided that such decisions do not negatively affect the pension plan or 
its beneficiaries (see Yaron, 2001, 2003 and 2004; Carmichael, 2003; Freshfields, 2005; 
Milevsky, Aziz, Goss, Thomson and Wheeler, 2005).  These counter-arguments are becoming 
more prevalent and sophisticated; however, as will be elaborated later, labor trustees who wish to 
adopt a stakeholder perspective still face considerable difficulty in overcoming the traditional 
fiduciary duty argument. 
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      Within the pension environment, the role of unions and their representatives involves 
making three inter-related strategic decisions.  First, unions must decide if they want a seat on 
the board.  If yes, they must work to obtain that seat, whether through collective bargaining, 
government intervention or other means, and choose to fill it with either a labor trustee or a 
professional hired for the purpose.  Second, unions must decide how the labor trustee will 
acquire the financial background necessary to actively participate in investment decisions to 
protect the pensions of fund beneficiaries.  Third, unions must decide if they want their trustees 
to push for the application alternative investment policies.  Such policies could consider 
environmental practices, place screens on enterprises that seek to privatize public services and 
focus on investments that benefit communities through encouraged development of local 
business or promotion of affordable housing.  Investment policy could also consider labor 
relations and employment standards such that pension fund investment could be used 
strategically either against recalcitrant employers or toward employers with labor-friendly 
policies and behaviours (Fung, Hebb and Rogers, 2001; Grayson and Hodges, 2002; Hannah, 
2003; Wheeler and Thomson, 2004; Manley, Hebb and Jackson, 2005; Hebb and Jackson, 2002).   
When considering their first strategic decision, whether or not to participate in pension 
governance, unions face a choice somewhat akin to union participation in decision-making along 
with management.  In the research literature, it is generally well recognized that in considering 
this opportunity, unions face a difficult choice.  Participating in managerial decision-making can 
be a double-edged sword.  While it may give the union greater say in workplace matters it also 
prevents the union from acting independently of management.  Rank-and-file members may 
view union leadership as becoming closer to management than to their own interests.  At a 
practical level, this could lead to an ouster of the leadership or at the very least it would create 
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tensions between the union leadership and union members (Eaton and Rubinstein, 2006; Eaton 
and Schurman 2006).  Other writers on the topic have suggested that it will be theoretically 
difficult for unions to represent worker interests if they adopt a more managerial view of the 
organization (Parker and Slaughter 1988; Katz 1988; MacDuffie 1995; Eaton and Schurman 
1996).  All these arguments are also applicable to the union decision to seek a seat at the pension 
board.  These problems notwithstanding, there has been an “expansion of local union 
involvement in firm governance and management” that challenges “the managerial prerogatives 
established by the New Deal industrial relations system” (Rubinstein 2001: 411) and union 
involvement in pension plan governance can be seen as a subset of this expansion.   
A few unions such as the Canadian Autoworkers’ Union (CAW) have decided to 
maintain the traditional demarcation between labor and management on pension plan issues.  In 
remarks to the IQPC Canada Conference on Pension Investment & Governance, Jo-Ann Hannah, 
a CAW staffer, summarized the CAW’s lack of enthusiasm in participating in pension fund 
governance.  For one, public sector unions generally have one or two large pension plans where 
private sector unions have hundreds of plans.  The cost of providing training and on-going 
support to labor trustees in these cases is prohibitive.  Second, private sector unions are able to 
collectively bargain for pension improvement or change where public sector unions are not.  
Third, the CAW view is that unions should not buy into the neo-liberal ideology that the market 
is central to the democratic process.  They argue that unions should bargain for increased 
pensions and benefits through traditional arms length processes and fight the battle of social 
responsibility and worker’s rights in other forums (Hannah, 2003; see also Stanford, 1999).     
In order to successfully expand their role in governance and management, unions must 
carefully consider, prepare for and address the changing risks and required resources associated 
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with representing their membership in new ways (Rubinstein, 2001; Eaton and Rubinstein, 
2006).  For example, the Ontario Teachers’ Federation received negative backlash from many 
unions and pension activists in response to the United Food and Commercial Workers’ Union 
(UFCW) strike against Maple Leaf Foods in 1997-1998.  As major shareholders in Maple Leaf 
Foods the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board did nothing while members of UFCW across 
Canada fought to resist concessions (many against benefits packages that did not include a 
pension plan) and job loss.  Critics argued that the Teachers should have leveraged their 
shareholder power to pressured Maple Leaf Foods to work for a fair contract.  This type of action 
is a completely new approach for unions and their members and raises a host of questions about 
the use of pension fund power.  For these reasons, unions embarking on pension involvement 
must enter this new arena with an understanding of the risks involved and with a clear and 
articulated assessment of their purpose.  In direct relation to the experiences that local union 
leaders face as they experiment with co-management techniques (Rubinstein, 2001) labor 
trustees must not be caught unprepared in responding to concerns within the labor community. 
Labor trustees must be provided with the necessary resources by their unions if they are to 
succeed in achieving labor’s mission.  This study is an attempt to identify the resources that labor 
trustees need at personal and institutional levels. 
These resources are important for the second and third decisions that unions must make 
regarding the training and agenda of the labor trustee.  By getting to the second level (obtaining 
and seat and basic financial training), unions and their labor trustees can ensure stronger 
financial health of their pension funds through increased diligence and attention to investment 
matters.  By pushing through to the third level of alternative investment policy unions and their 
labor trustees can ensure the protection and growth of their pension monies, but they can also 
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benefit their constituencies, their fellow workers in the broader labor movement, and the social, 
economic and environmental health of their greater communities.  However, and as this research 
will show, many unions are at the first stage and are only beginning to realize the potential of 
pension board representation.  Those unions that have achieved a seat have largely stalemated at 
the second stage with only a few achieving some impact on the governance of pensions in terms 
of socially responsible investment (SRI), economically targeted investment (ETI) or the leverage 
of shareholder proxy votes to promote corporate good governance and other outcomes.  To 
achieve these ends labor trustees must be able to challenge the traditional models of pension 
investment and governance.  Otherwise, they risk becoming token members of the board.   
 
Research Method 
Several sources of data were used for this exploratory research.  Primarily, semi-
structured interviews were conducted with nineteen labor trustees on pension boards and one 
labor representative on a pension fund advisory committee.  On several occasions the interviews 
were recorded with an audio recorder, although some trustees preferred that we take notes only.  
The interview transcripts were analyzed for common themes and key individual or unique 
comments.  As the pension trustee community is small, interviewees were assured anonymity in 
any publication of our results and their names are not reported nor associated with their union 
and pension plan affiliation.  
A copy of the interview protocol is included as Appendix 1, though it should be noted 
that occasional deviation occurred in individual cases to accommodate specific situations. The 
interview questions consist of ten open-ended questions that roughly follow the induction of the 
individual as a trustee and the steps they go through in becoming effectively integrated into the 
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board. Since our purpose in interviewing them was to learn more about the underlying problems 
and prospects for trustee effectiveness the questions were deliberately written to be exploratory. 
The basic idea here was to encourage the interviewee to open up a dialogue and talk through 
their experiences. The intent was to learn as much as possible about the processes so that later we 
could identify a more structured process to describe the trustee induction, integration and 
development.  
The sample used in this study is not entirely representative.  Indeed, through the course of 
this research and related work, we identified many factors that made it difficult to obtain a large 
representative sample of labor trustees.  There is no comprehensive and published listing of labor 
trustees in Canada.  Some plans have websites with information about the governance structure.  
Of these sites most indicate the number of labor trustees on the board and some include a listing 
of names and/or union affiliation.  A small number list full contact details.  When contacted, 
most pension plan staff were reluctant to disclose contact information.  Unions seem somewhat 
more willing, although some union staff were unsure of the identity of their pension trustees or 
who might have such information.  We relied, therefore, on our personal networks and those of 
the Pensions at Work Research Network (PAW, 2004).  This initial search led us to interview 
eight very experienced trustees, most of whom were also high profile pension activists.  These 
interviews formed the core sample of this study because our informants were in a position to 
comment on their many years of trusteeship and their evolving needs.  Following these 
interviews, twelve additional labor trustees were contacted and interviewed.  As with the first, 
this second wave was largely a convenience sample although greater attention was paid to 
achieving a balanced slate of participants in terms of gender, visible minority status, board 
tenure, geographical region, and plan sector.   
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The resulting sample represents four funds based in Ontario, one in Quebec, four from 
the Atlantic provinces, eight from the Western provinces, and three that are under the federal 
jurisdiction.  They are predominately public sector funds (fourteen of the twenty).  Most 
interviewees are white men with four women and two racial minorities represented.  Tenure as a 
trustee ranges from several months to well over ten years,  All interviewees are over the age of 
thirty-five and most have had considerable seniority in their occupations and unions (see 
Appendix 2 for interviewee profiles).  Private sector funds are underrepresented as are Quebec-
based funds.  There is no representation of members of the financial community who are 
appointed by unions to act as labor trustees (i.e., labor trustees from the Ontario Teachers’ Plan) 
as they represent a group that is markedly different from trustees who are union staff or rank and 
file union members.   
Information was also gathered through meetings with a union reference group that was 
brought together under the auspices of the Pensions at Work project (PAW, 2004).  Contact was 
made with this research group on three occasions where aspects of the study and pension life 
were discussed and verified.  In what follows we draw on the voices of these labor trustees and 
integrate their experiences with past research on union involvement in pension governance, labor 
trustees and member representatives.  Through these sources we develop a model of labor trustee 
representation on pension boards that follows the logical sequence of recruitment and selection, 
training and development and accountability.  As such this research represents an attempt to 
ground some of the common themes and points of controversy in labor trustee experiences and 
present a framework for a better understanding of the process in the hope that this would lead to 
more effective representation of labor interests on pension boards (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
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This work is also important to any large sample survey of trustees that can be undertaken in the 
future (Rubinstein, 2001). 
 
The Life of a Labor Trustee: Previous Literature and Interview Data 
Job Demands & Steep Learning Curve 
The actual tasks in which labor trustees are engaged, the compensation they receive for 
their role and logistics such as term length and meeting frequency varied widely among our 
interviewees.   However, they all spoke of the binder that they receive only a few days prior to 
the board meeting and typically hold up their fingers to indicate its one to two inch thickness.  
One trustee’s comments reflect the general sentiment, “It takes a full day just to figure out what 
you understand and what you don’t, let alone learn what you don’t.” (PTI04)  Once in the 
meeting the binder is discussed cover to cover often at a rapid pace that assumes complete 
understanding.  In the midst of these discussions the trustees are required to quickly vote on 
decisions that are based on the binder contents and may concern the allocation of millions of 
dollars (Post, 2005).  All interviewees felt that they could ask questions during the meeting, but 
some felt that this slowed down the proceedings and caused annoyance (PTI04; PTI08).  The 
short notice of the binder delivery precludes attempts to contact other labor trustees or activate 
support networks to gain knowledge or to solidify a particular response or stance on an issue.   
      In addition to the meeting preparation that occurs for two or three days beforehand, 
trustees spend time in the meetings (often 4-15 meetings or days per year) and several trustees 
reported spending more than 20 extra hours in general learning time per meeting (PTI01; PTI07; 
PTI08; PTI13; PTI16).  This time is often not recognized in the compensation schemes for labor 
trustees who are typically paid for work missed for meeting time only.  As a result many trustees 
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may not have the time or the will to engage in extra learning or networking (PTI14; PTI15).  In 
this way their potential as a strong labor representative is hampered because they do not attain 
the knowledge or perspective necessary to be a full participant. Interviewees told us that they 
must devote a considerable amount of their personal time to ensure success in their role and that 
they often bring leadership or union activist experience and a social consciousness to their 
position as a trustee.  These experiences and the characteristics such as confidence, willingness 
to learn and ability to work in challenging environments that were developed through these 
experiences allowed the trustees in our sample to feel that they were effective labour 
representatives.    
Recruitment and Selection  
The selection procedures for labor trustees vary greatly, in part due to the different 
governance models previously outlined in Table 1.  Labor trustees or their representatives can be 
appointed by the union from outside of the union, recommended by the union but officially 
appointed by the government or the plan itself, elected by plan participants, or selected by the 
union.  The internal process for identifying talent to serve in this role is similar to the way unions 
select other functional specialists.  It is a process of nomination by the union leadership. Even 
though in some unions the nominated person must then face an election, the nomination by the 
union executive is generally authoritative in securing the job for that person.  As a result unions 
tend to select or recommend union staff, union activists or elected union officials for the role of 
pension trustee.  One trustee reported knowing nothing about pensions before he started, but he 
feels that he had a lot of other skills, such as leadership ability, confidence, union experience, the 
gift of persuasion, and public speaking skills that made him a good trustee (PTI17).  The sense 
that there was more to the job of labor trustee than the financial knowledge was shared by all 
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interviewees and many believed that this, with proper training, could be learned ‘on-the-job.’  
What they deemed more important from the outset was strong leadership capability and a solid 
union perspective.   
Despite the sentiments above, all interviewees agreed that the learning curve was 
incredibly steep and required a sustained and concerted effort to overcome.  As one trustee 
stated, “Regardless of their background very few people are well prepared for the educational 
demands of being a trustee.” (PTI07)  As such the traditional nomination process used by unions 
could be augmented by a more formal selection approach.  Human resource management 
professionals recommend that formal selection should include the following steps: a job 
description, posting the job description to recruit a pool of qualified talent and then select the 
person for the job using validated methods.  Some trustees in our sample did face more 
formalized systems consisting of competency tests, statements of interest and interviews (PTI02; 
PTI03).  However, this level of formality may not suit the political culture of unions and an 
integrated approach may be more suitable.   
      An optimal blending of the two approaches can be done in a variety of ways.  In our 
sample several trustees were union staff members of pensions and benefits committees while 
another was selected because of her knowledge about pensions on a policy level.  A more 
deliberate approach (suggested by a member of the Pensions at Work Union Reference Group) 
would be to identify a pool of plan members, either by interest or ability or both, and train them 
in pension issues.  When a labour trustee position becomes available the new trustee would be 
formally selected or elected from this pool.  The ultimate formality of the recruitment and 
selection process is one of debate within unions as each approach raises different issues with 
respect to ideology and financial and temporal resources.  This matter will also require more 
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research as to whether trustees who begin their role with a more concrete background are more 
effective than those who do not. 
Knowledge and Ability Acquisition: Training and Social Networks 
According to Schuller and Hyman (1984: 63), labor trustees generally lack the personal 
and organizational resources of “formal or informal expertise and the breadth and depth of 
experience, whether this is accumulated inside or outside the pension world.”  Very little formal 
training is provided to labor trustees either from the employer, fund, or the union and very few 
enter their position with sufficient financial savvy (Schuller and Hyman, 1983b, see also Myners, 
2001).  As well trustees are reported to have few sources of advice independent of the fund. This 
dependence on the inside sources further reduces the possibility of developing external social 
networks and other supports for independent learning.   
Existing Training   
Our interviews and feedback from pension conferences suggest that traditional training in 
pension issues does exist, but it is often not adequate in meeting the needs of labor trustees (see 
also Hebb and Jackson, 2002).  Labor trustees are perceived as disseminators of information by 
the fund managers (and often themselves) as opposed to active participants in deciding 
investment policy, monitoring fund performance and appointing fund advisors (Schuller and 
Hyman, 1983b).  Fund managers, advisors and the financial community are reported to exhibit a 
paternalistic attitude toward labor trustees and what training is provided is largely offered by the 
financial community and does not substantially question traditional approaches, ideologies and 
perspectives (Carmichael and Quarter, 2003).   
       One interviewee received no training when he first joined a pension advisory committee.  
It was only after the fund administrators realized that there was a legal responsibility for the 
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actions of the advisory committee that the fund sponsored some training programs.  However, 
these training programs were not seen as sufficient by the labor representatives (PTI12).  Labor 
trustees describe courses that are short and introductory.  They are replete with jargon and are 
often provided through a finance or business lens and rarely deviate from, let alone question 
traditional pension governance (PTI01; PTI02; PTI13; PTI17).  As well, these courses typically 
cater to pension trustees or board members in general and do not address some of the needs 
specific to labor trustees such as reconciling their role or bringing forth alternative perspectives.     
      Interviewees also attend pension trustee conferences, but some described them as 
“industry gab fests” where “trustees get schmoozed and further indoctrinated.” (PTI01)  In 
addition to educational programming that may be sponsored by the pension fund, union or 
employer, trustees also take courses on their own initiative.  These include courses to earn their 
Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) designation or Canadian Securities courses (PTI01; PTI17) 
that cover investment and finance issues beyond pensions and are also from a traditional finance 
perspective.  In line with these findings and previous research (Hebb and Jackson, 2002), unions 
and education providers are beginning to develop on-going training specific to labour trustees on 
pension boards at the introductory and advanced level [i.e., Canadian Union of Public Employees 
(CUPE), Shareholder Association for Research and Education (SHARE), Manitoba Centre for 
Labour Capital, Pensions at Work, and the Fédération des Travailleurs du Québec (FTQ)]. 
Training Needed 
The new programming mentioned above attempts to provide basic knowledge for trustees 
in areas such as accounting, investing and actuarial knowledge; however, there are other areas 
where gaps exist in the traditional focus of training currently available.  One trustee explained 
that there are two steps to conquering the large learning curve.  The first step is to achieve the 
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“technical proficiency of the financial lingo, how the financial industry operates, how pensions 
operate…”  The second step is to develop critical thinking and alternative viewpoints and 
includes issues of SRI, ETI, proxy voting, and other labor agendas (PTI01).  As this trustee 
further emphasized, “an educated trustee is not necessarily a critical trustee,”  but the reality of 
pension issues is that trustees barely achieve step one let alone proceed to the next level where 
they can start exercising their position and influencing the board (PTI01).  Other trustees 
corroborated this difficulty stating, “It took two years just to get up to speed and start” (PTI02) 
and, “What do union people know about stocks and bonds?  It is another universe…It’s a very 
very very steep learning curve.  I’ve never had such a steep learning curve.  And it is always 
there.” (PTI02)  Such sentiments represent a particular problem for the effectiveness of labor 
trustees with short tenure on the board.  Typically the term of appointment is three years; though 
many trustees serve multiple terms if subsequent appointment decisions or elections are 
favorable.  The median tenure for our sample is 3.5 years while the mean tenure is 6 years.    
      The interviewees seemed content to attend traditional finance courses as an introductory 
step, but they agreed that it was necessary to follow-up with a structured and on-going system 
specific to labor trustees as they become more experienced and begin tackling new issues.  
Trustees also agreed that more detailed books on pension issues from a labor perspective and 
‘how-to’ manuals or success stories would be useful resources.  Also important to labor trustees 
is training that will provide the opportunity to think about pension issues critically and from a 
new vantage point.  As several interviewees agreed, providing labor trustees with the ability to 
argue confidently and convincingly from a labor perspective is a critical need (PTI04; PTI16; 
PTI17).  Examples include new interpretations of the prudence principle or the concept of the 
triple bottom line (social, environment and financial) to advocate for shareholder activism, proxy 
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voting and socially responsible investment (see Ambachtsheer, 2005; Carmichael, 2003; 
Milevsky, et al., 2005; Clark, Salo and Hebb, 2005; Yaron, 2001, 2003 and 2004).   
      It is clear from these findings that more training tailored to meet the needs of labor 
trustees and emphasize and support a labor agenda will increase their levels of participation on 
the board and also make them better advocates for labor goals and objectives.  This enrichment 
of the educational tools carries a variety of implications.  Enhanced cooperation among unions 
and among education providers is necessary to share and build on the good courses and 
experiences already created.  Appropriate amounts of time and resources need to be devoted to 
administering these programs and creating new programs to fill the training gaps identified in 
this paper.   
Social Networks   
Typically a labor trustee has the potential to access a large and varied network for advice 
or support; however, the development of these networks requires a concerted effort (Jarley, 
2005).  As labor trustees are most often selected or elected within the network of union hierarchy 
they almost invariably possess extensive connections within the labor movement.  As well, 
where there is more than one labor trustee on the board, a network may be easier to create.  
Interviewees reported situations where more experienced trustees assist newer trustees or where 
union pension staff in trustee roles can act as mentors for those trustees who are rank and filers 
and have less experience with the pension or financial world or the “union world view” (PTI01; 
PTI17).  However, this mentoring is very informal and labor trustees often have little contact 
with each other outside of the board meetings.  As well with multi-union plans trustees do not 
share the same union background or perspective and may have difficulty making an immediate 
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connection.  An example of this is the OMERS board which has five labor trustees from five 
different unions. 
      Existing contacts outside of the union environment, particularly in the managerial and 
financial realms are more limited.  Trust is often a serious issue for labor trustees particularly 
when they are new to their position.  In the words of one trustee, “you are not ever sure who you 
can rely on, depend on, who will mentor you – who you can ask without making yourself look 
bad.” (PTI04)  It is very important that trustees locate advisors to help them understand their role 
and the associated jargon, rules and procedures; however, in doing so the trustee must also be 
careful to maintain some semblance of understanding, confidence and competence.  In this 
environment where trustees are continually guarding their perspective and their potential 
weaknesses, the trust and understanding necessary to build a strong network of support is 
difficult to establish.  A labor trustee’s effort to develop relationships with other people 
associated with the fund is also thwarted by the pervasive sense of not-belonging, of being 
unwanted or unaccepted.  Interviewees reported experiences of not being introduced the first 
time they attended meetings, of being asked for their resumes by other board members, or feeling 
excluded from board decisions (PTI04; PTI09; PTI11; PTI19).  As a result, the process of 
discovering potential allies or independent sources of advice is slow and full of pitfalls.  
Weatherly and Tansik (1996) suggested that talking to and obtaining social support from others 
is important in overcoming the role ambiguity that labor trustees face (discussed in more detail 
below).  As one trustee stated, “A strong network with other trustees and pension plans helps to 
increase comfort levels for trustees and build confidence in decision-making at all levels.” 
(PTI10)  
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      Though all interviewees indicated that a mechanism to facilitate the development of labor 
trustee networks would be a welcome and worthwhile endeavor, the development of successful 
social networks requires mechanisms for making and sustaining contact.  Currently there is no 
listing of labor trustees on pension boards maintained by any labor organization.  Labor trustees 
on different boards have little knowledge of or contact with trustees on other boards.  Thus, there 
is limited opportunity for support or knowledge sharing among trustees.  Jarley (2005) presents 
the lack of social networks within unions as a growing problem in an article proposing a social 
capital model to union organization.  He argues for the return to grassroots forms of internal 
organization that center around worker networks to revitalize and reconnect the union 
membership.  He writes that “such workers tend to be disconnected from one another and 
because of their disconnectedness, lack the resources necessary to organize on their own.” 
(Jarley, 2005: 20)  This argument can be extended beyond the internal organization of individual 
unions and applied to the diffuse relations among labor trustees across unions.  Individual trustee 
or union resources can be pooled and magnified through an organized network.  As labour 
trustees operate largely in isolation across Canada it may be necessary to develop multi-tiered 
networks (i.e., with trustees on the same board, with trustees in the same city, with trustees in the 
same union and then, ideally, with trustees across unions, across the country, and 
internationally).  Though the possibilities are almost endless, the maintenance of these networks 
could involve more regular and formalized meetings of labour trustees, the development of on-
line resources, or communiqués, newsletters or bulletins catering to labour trustees.   
Union/Labor Agenda  
If this paper were focused on demarcating the steps to become an effective pension 
trustee we could perhaps stop now.  However, beyond formal recruitment and selection, 
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sufficient training and accessible social networks, it could be argued that a labor trustee on the 
pension board must receive clear directives from the union to be an effective alternative voice.  
Interviewees spoke at length about their fit within the board and within their union and the 
trouble they experience in delimiting or maintaining their social identity.  Particularly when labor 
representation is first achieved, there is often an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality at the board 
(PTI09; PTI11).  However, it is not always clear who is ‘us’ and who is ‘them.’  Labor trustees 
represent their coworkers, fund beneficiaries and their union while also sharing the board table 
with employer trustees and financial advisors.  Thus, labor trustees likely receive feedback from 
each of these groups regarding their expectations of a trustee’s role behaviour and performance. 
It would be unrealistic to assume that that the trustee will be fully aligned or sympathetic with 
the values of each group in making investment decisions.  On the one hand, labor trustees feel 
isolated from the other board members due to differences in perceived and/or actual competence 
and their association with the union.  For example, on issues of SRI or alternative investment 
models, the traditional financial perspective conflicts with that of pension activists and most 
labor activists.  On the other hand, situations arise where the trustees are united in a decision that 
benefits plan members, but may be contrary to either the employer or the union (PTI18; PTI20).  
This occurs in times of surplus when unions typically advocate redistribution to plan members as 
an immediate benefit, employers advocate a contribution holiday, and the trustees (labor and 
otherwise) would advocate maintenance and reinvestment to grow the future pot (PTI02).   
There are also situations where the labor trustee is simply not taken seriously regardless 
of their perspective.  This is particularly detrimental when labor trustees are in a minority on the 
board or in the case of advisory committees that hold no real power.  Schuller and Hyman (1984) 
identify barriers to information sharing and trust.  They argue that a cycle of distrust could 
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emerge where the upward and downward flows of information between the labor trustee(s) and 
the employer representatives, the labor trustee(s) and the union, or the labor trustee(s) and other 
pension staff and advisors are suspect and guarded.  This distrust and protectionism may also 
develop due to the suspicion that the information channeled down through the labor trustees to 
fund beneficiaries (union members) or channeled up to fund managers may be abused.  This 
distrust is highlighted in a statement made by a pension manager in Schuller and Hyman’s study 
(1984: 64): “One disadvantage [of participation] is that it can prompt demands for more 
information.  You get into the grey area of relation between participation and collective 
bargaining – they innocently ask for information in the participation context, then use it for 
collective bargaining.”  In this case the manager’s suspicions were heightened by the presence of 
the union’s pensions bargaining committee and their perceived or actual relationship with labor 
trustees on the pension board.  The result is that what information disclosure is sanctioned as a 
primary duty of the labor trustee tends to focus on details of individual beneficiary concern 
rather than the strategic functioning of the fund or the financial reports (Schuller and Hyman, 
1983b). 
Some of our interviewees acknowledged these barriers to involvement and noted that it 
can feel like labor trustees just rubber-stamp decisions made by others (PTI19; PTI12).  This 
relates directly to the “official or de facto exclusion [of the labor trustee] from relevant decision-
making bodies,” noted by Schuller and Hyman (1984: 63).  There the potential that employer or 
government appointed trustees also act as rubber stamps for decisions.  As mentioned earlier, the 
Myners Report indicated that many trustees do not have professional experience in investing and 
spend little time preparing before making investment decisions.  The inference from this report is 
that some trustees may be detrimentally uncritical of the assumed expertise of actuaries or fund 
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managers.  Schuller and Hyman (1984: 63) refer to these effects as the ‘social desirability effect’ 
and note that it is felt by all trustees.  They report that open disagreement at the board table is 
rare.  Often the comments and proposals from both the labor and employer trustees/fund 
managers are constrained by “self-censorship” where proposals or comments are withheld if the 
anticipated response is perceived as negative.  Such norms of deference may further 
disadvantage labor trustees because of their restricted access to and experience with high level 
company information and decision-making and the unavailability of training programs that target 
non-professional fiduciaries (U.S. Department of Labor, 2002).  As such, labor trustees may be 
more likely to acquiesce to the advice of management and other fund advisors and not exercise 
the degree of independent decision-making potentially available to them (Deaton, 1989).   
      For many, the ambiguity and occasional duty to act like an employer (i.e., when 
distributing a surplus or hiring fund managers) can weaken their association with the union.  One 
trustee makes this point with respect to the fiduciary responsibility argument. “[Fiduciary 
responsibility] says you will act in the best interests of the pension plan and in saying that a lot of 
trustees will then lose their role as a union representative.” (PTI17)  The trustee goes on to 
describe the difficulty faced when bringing forth a labor perspective within the ‘old boys club’ 
mentality of the board.  “Because there is this collegial atmosphere, there tends to be less 
challenging and when you interject with a union perspective into that sort of milieu, if you seem 
too overt they can always fall back on the notion that you are not following your fiduciary 
responsibility.”  (PTI17)  Some trustees also mentioned the ‘wining and dining’ and subtle co-
option process that occurs when trustees are invited to expensive industry parties and when they 
are exposed to an environment of power previously closed to them (PTI02; PTI17).  It is 
important to note, however that this process is often very intangible.  Several trustees noted 
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positive relationships with their employer or government counterparts and stated that they were 
sometimes convinced to side with the labor trustees on particular issues (PTI18; PTI20).   
      Schuller and Hyman (1984) report that labor trustees often just act as watch dogs.  Their 
presence and questions obligate the fund managers to provide more detailed explanations of 
proposals and forces them to anticipate and answer alternative questions.  However they also 
suggest that labor trustees can take a more proactive and participatory role and propose 
investment alternatives and/or engage in debate over submitted proposals.  Choosing one of these 
positions and developing a clear union agenda on the purpose of their labor trustee(s) is 
paramount for the success of a strong labor voice on pension issues.  This overarching strategy 
(either within a union or within the labor movement as a whole) can then inform the 
development of labor-centric training programmes and the creation of networks of labor activists 
and other labor trustees around pension issues.  This clear agenda will also likely impact the 
recruitment and selection process because the applicant most able to deliver on that agenda 
should be selected.  With cohesive frameworks and clear messages at each stage of their 
development, the labor trustee can be expected to be better able to articulate alternative 
investment objectives at the board table, and thus, be a more effective voice for labor interests.   
 Accountability  
  To maintain this cohesiveness and support the strategic agenda, a stronger administrative 
link between the union and the labor trustee is needed.  It is necessary to link the strategic 
planning regarding labor trustee roles and expectations to the functional stages of trustee 
development.  Currently, there is very little answerability of labor trustees to their unions or the 
plan beneficiaries.  Indeed, many cannot be removed by the union or by a constituency that has 
lost confidence because they are officially appointed by the employer or government (PTI17).  
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Only one trustee in our sample mentioned any sort of assessment process and it was at the board 
level.  In his case all trustees undergo an annual self-assessment and interview by the board 
chair, the results of which are discussed at the board table (PTI05).  One issue that arises here is 
the extent to which a union may want to maintain a close rein on the trustee.  This would depend 
on the strategy that a union may adopt for its control of pension funds.  If the union wants a 
purely fiduciary monitoring role for itself then it does not need to set up tight accountability 
controls on its trustee.  Fiduciary duty is well-defined in statutes and pension regulations.  On the 
other hand if the union wants to use, for example, proxy voting at selected firms to send a 
message to employers then it needs an accountability regime in which the trustee would work 
closely and meet frequently with union leadership to develop strategies for proxy voting.   
      As well, though unions have fought for labor representation through legislation or 
collective bargaining, the issues of pension governance do not seem to be a top priority.  Trustees 
commented that the union is “not interested in training workers to become mini-capitalists” 
(PTI01), that the union only shows interest when there is a surplus or controversy (PTI02; PTI09; 
PTI17), and that there is a lack of institutional union support for trustees (PTI05; PTI06).  One 
interviewee said that he was not required to report to the union on pension matters, but he would 
always scan the material received at meetings and send it to the union.  He never received 
feedback and was convinced that no one even read the material that he had sent (PTI12).  It 
appears that reporting structures that do exist between labor trustees and unions are informal, ad 
hoc and largely initiated by the trustee.   
In conjunction with the devotion of resources to the creation and support of labor-centric 
pension education, unions need to re-evaluate their position on pension issues and commit to the 
support of their labor trustees.  Structures which link trustees to their unions for accountability, 
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direction, and support are largely absent, but trustees do want them and feel that they would 
benefit from the connection.  The lack of pension issues as a union priority erodes the connection 
between the trustee and the union and therefore the development of a labor agenda on pension 
matters.  The establishment of a pension priority and links between trustees and their unions will 
necessitate the creation of new administrative structures, feedback loops and the commitment to 
bring a clear union agenda to the pension board table.   
 
A Framework for Labor Trustee Effectiveness 
As noted earlier in the paper, many of the challenges faced by unions as they involve 
themselves in pension governance are similar to those faced by unions who attempt to expand 
their role in governance and management more broadly.  Union members involved in 
management decision-making more broadly have faced many of the same experiences as the 
labor trustees interviewed for this research.  Some key similarities include: the tension associated 
with labor participants slowing down decision-making; the lack of time for caucusing among 
labor participants before or during meetings; the lack of before meetings to gain additional 
knowledge; the feeling of not belonging; the inconsistency of selection methods and the paucity 
of accountability mechanisms; the lack of a clear union agenda regarding expected behaviours 
and desired outcomes; and the need for more union resources (time and money) to be devoted to 
the participatory process (Eaton and Rubinstein, 2006).   
As an aid to addressing and overcoming these challenges, we develop a model that 
codifies the important components and stages of labor participation in pension governance and 
more general participation in management decisions.  The model links the external constraints 
within which the trustee must operate (personal, board and job characteristics), the functional 
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processes of trustee development (recruitment and selection, training and development of social 
networks, and levels of integration and participation on the board), and unions’ strategic choices 
in defining trustee roles (union agenda and accountability structures).  This model is depicted in 
Figure 1.  Though we did not explicitly study trustee effectiveness in this research, we propose 
that labor trustees will be more effective members of the pension plan board of trustees if they 
arrive at the table with a clearly defined role, a well articulated purpose, and sufficient support 
through training and social networks.  Future research on a larger and more quantitative scale is 
necessary to test this hypothesis.   
Throughout this research, we have advocated for a stakeholder approach toward union 
involvement in pension governance; however, this model recognizes that some unions may 
choose to take a more conservative approach.  The implication here is that the resources 
committed to trustee support and development will be different depending on the strategic 
choices and goals of the union.  Regardless of those specific goals, trustee development should 
be aligned with union strategy through appropriate accountability systems to maximize the 
trustee’s ability to carry out those goals.   
      In many ways this model follows the methodology used in human resource management 
in organizations.  Candidates are first recruited based on a job description that is posted to attract 
applicants and then the best person for the job is selected from a qualified pool by assessing 
potential performance on specific job-related criteria.  After selection the successful candidate 
begins the job and undergoes orientation and training to give them the skills needed for 
successful performance on the job.  During this period the new hire will develop formal and 
informal social networks with colleagues, supervisors and external contacts.  They also begin to 
draw on the social networks they have previously developed to help them cope with the demands 
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of the new job.  Following these steps, the new hire reaches a stage where they have achieved a 
certain mastery of the characteristics of the job and are integrated and participating members of 
the organization.  Decisions and actions at each of these stages are influenced by the 
organization’s strategic plan and vision and this link is reinforced by systems of accountability 
such as performance reviews and regular feedback meetings.  The personal characteristics that an 
individual brings to the job, the nature and description of the job itself and the characteristics of 
the workplace also act to influence each of these stages. If these steps are followed faithfully, the 
process is predicted to yield positive outcomes such as effectiveness performance on the job and 
worker satisfaction. 
For unions, which are political organizations, the human resource management sequence 
of recruitment, selection, training and performance review, etc., may prove to be too linear and 
inorganic.  Unions need to develop leaders who can represent their constituency and mobilize 
resources to achieve their goals through the exercise of power.  This process is often 
idiosyncratic and organic.  It is hard to predict who will emerge as a leader and one can not apply 
simple processes of human resource management to identify union leaders.  Hence, it would be 
unrealistic to suggest that the political model used by unions should be cast aside to make room 
for a more systematic approach to finding labor trustees.  However, the findings of this study 
suggest that there is room to blend the best features of the human resource management approach 
with that of the political approach to identifying leaders within the labor movement.  Trustees 
interviewed for this study have indicated fairly unambiguously that better training, accountability 
and a clearly identified mandate would go a long way in making them more effective in their 
roles on pension boards.  There is no reason why these activities would be incompatible with 
political processes within the union.  On the contrary, once the steps outlined in our model have 
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been widely disseminated as union policy, it is entirely likely that individuals aspiring to political 
leadership within the union will begin to acquire skills and experience that will make them 
suitable candidates for the pension trustee role.  Thus, both mandates, political and 
organizational effectiveness, can be achieved if findings of this study were to be addressed in 
future selection, training and performance of labor trustees. 
 
Conclusions 
In general, the trustees that we interviewed entered their roles with strong social networks 
within their own union, had benefited from union support and other organizational resources in 
their past roles as union officials and had gained important experience and knowledge as a result 
of those union activities.  They were confident, excellent communicators and were motivated to 
learn.  As well, they entered their role with strong union identities and values.  Each of these 
characteristics aids them as they navigate the intricacies of the pension board.  However, this 
study helps us identify five areas that hinder the integration and participation of labor trustees on 
the board.  Though not described or measured in this study, it is likely that labor trustees who are 
not integrated on the board and have decreased participation levels will be less effective in the 
role of pension trustee.  Further research is necessary to corroborate this inference.  Of the five 
areas of weakness, the first is that selection procedures are typically not tied to competencies or 
qualifications that are based upon the job description, characteristics or purpose of the labor 
trustee role.  Second, and in the same vein, new labor trustees have limited prior experience with 
pensions or financial matters.  Third, the knowledge and ability acquisition mechanisms that 
exist are often inadequate for labor trustees.  They lack adequate levels of formal training 
(particularly that which elucidates a labor perspective) and they have limited social networks 
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with labor trustees outside of their union, with their employer or government counterparts and 
with members of the financial community.  Fourth, most trustees do not have a clear structure of 
accountability that outlines their individual responsibilities to the union and the union 
constituency.  Lastly and perhaps most importantly, most unions have not developed a strategic 
plan for their labor trustees and the labor movement has not developed an agenda for their role in 
pension governance.    
       The implication of these findings is that token labor representation will not democratize 
the control of pension funds.  Without training, support and a strong agenda toward alternative 
investing on social, ethical and environmental grounds labor trustees will be isolated by their 
perceived conflicts of interest and held to firm lines of fiduciary responsibility.  Even the CAW, 
arguably the strongest critic against union involvement in pension governance, has labor trustees 
on some plans (i.e., Air Canada, CP Rail, VIA Rail) and must make practical decisions about 
their purpose and their support.  If individual unions and the labor movement as a whole can 
agree to and actively support a mandate on pension fund involvement and labor representation 
they can produce labor trustees who can influence investment strategies on their own boards, 
they can form coalitions with other pension activists and progressive investors, and they can 
lobby for pension and investment reform with a single, much stronger, voice.  This paper also 
adds to the general literature on union participation in governance and management.  As previous 
studies have shown, unions cannot embark on such involvement lightly.  Such decisions alter the 
relationships between unions and management, between unions and their membership and 
among the greater labor community.  They change expectations and set new standards 
(Rubinstein, 2001).  Unions, and in the case of pension governance, their trustees will more 
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easily navigate this new ground if they enter with an agreed upon plan of action and tangible 
expected outcomes.   
Future Research 
A final implication of this research is the application of this model beyond the Canadian 
context.  Despite differences in pension regulation and structure across Canada, labor trustees 
experience very similar situations on pension boards and face similar challenges.  As well, 
unions face similar struggles regarding their positions as social, economic and political actors.  
As such, the model developed here could be applied to labour trustees in other countries despite 
differences in overarching institutional frameworks.   
      This study is an important first step in examining the experiences of labor trustees on 
pension boards, but more research is necessary to develop a broader view and to verify the model 
presented.  Though the interviews conducted were quite informative they are a small set of views 
and also over-represent Ontario-based public sector pension plans.  To gain access to a larger 
sample of trustees from public and private pension plans across the country a large sample 
survey is needed.  Such a survey can better assess whether our findings in this study generalize to 
the population of labor trustees at large. 
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Table 1: Administrative Structures of Canadian Pension Plans 
 
 Representative Composition Labor Representative 
Selection 
Example Key Plan Characteristics 
1  sole union trusteeship 
 plan administered by a financial 
institution 
 elected by plan participants 
appointed by the union  
 Marine and Shipbuilders Pension 
Plan Local 506 British Columbia 
 Carpentry Workers Pension Plan of 
British Columbia 
 
 single union 
 multiple employers 
 
2  co-sponsored by union and 
government 
 joint-trusteeship 
 rotating Chair 
 
 elected or selected by union/plan 
members 
 Ontario Public Service Employees’ 
Union (OPSEU) Pension Trust 
 single union 
 single employer (provincial 
government of Ontario) 
3  equal representation 
 rotating Chair 
 elected or selected by union/plan 
members 
 
 Hospitals of Ontario Occupational 
Pension Plan 
 
 multiple unions (Canadian Union of 
Public Employees (CUPE), Service 
Employees International Union, 
Ontario Nurses’ Association, 
OPSEU) 
 multiple employers 
 Colleges of Applied Arts and 
Technology of Ontario Pension Plan 
  
 single union (OPSEU) 
 multiple employers 
 employee representatives appointed 
by government (often on 
recommendations by union) 
 Ontario Municipal Employees’ 
Retirement System (OMERS) 
  
 multiple unions (CUPE, 
International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers, Firefighters 
Association, Police Association) 
 single employer 
4  equal representation 
 rotating Chair 
 union recommends representatives to 
government 
 Alberta Public Service Pension Plan 
  
 single union (Alberta Union of 
Public Employees) 
 single employer (government of 
Alberta) 
5  equal representation for union and 
employer sponsors  
 independent Chair 
 sponsoring union selects its own 
representatives (often from 
business/financial community) 
 Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan  
 
 single union (Ontario Teachers’ 
Federation) 
 single employer (Government of 
Ontario) 
6  equal representation  
 employer Chair (extra employer rep) 
 union recommends representatives to 
employer (one from English unions, 
 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
(CBC) Pension Plan 
 multiple unions/associations 
 single employer (CBC) 
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one from French unions and one 
from Pensioners Association 
  
7  legislated representation for union 
and employer 
 not necessarily equal 
 
 elected or selected by union/plan 
members 
 all Pension Plans in Québec  mixture of single-multiple union and 
single-multiple employer depending 
on plan 
8  advisory committee with equal 
representation 
 government/employer sole trustee 
 
 elected by plan members  Canadian Pacific Rail Pension Plan  multiple unions 
 single employer 
9  advisory committee with equal 
representation 
 government sole trustee (Minister of 
Finance) 
 
 union recommends representatives to 
government 
 
 
 Nova Scotia Public Service 
Superannuation Plan 
 multiple unions (NSGEU, CUPE) 
 single employer (Government of 
Nova Scotia) 
10  little or no union representation 
 unions aspire to more equal role 
 
  Hydro One  multiple unions 
 single employer 
11  no union representation   General Motors Canada 
 
 single union (CAW) 
 single employer 
Adapted from Carmichael, 1998 with additions from CUPE, 1996; Greenan, 2003; PTI19; PTI12. 
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Figure 1: Model of Effective Labor Representation on Pension Boards 
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Appendix 1: Questions for Interviews with Labor Trustees 
 
1. How long have you been in the labour force?   
How long have you been a member of your union?  
How long have you been a pension trustee? 
What is your current job? 
 
2. How did you become a pension trustee? 
 
3. When you first became a pension trustee, how much experience did you have dealing with 
pension funds? 
What previous training or experience did you find had prepared you for your role as a 
pension trustee? 
In what areas did you find your background to be lacking in terms of doing your job as a 
pension trustee? 
 
4. When you first became a pension trustee, who did you turn to for advice or support in your 
role?  Who do you turn to now? [i.e. other trustees, union staff, pension staff, other sources] 
How many times do you meet in a year? Do you think you are prepared for meetings? How 
much material do you receive? How do you handle getting up to speed on the material? 
 
5. Does information flow well between trustees?  Between fund advisors and/or staff and 
trustees? Between union trustees and the union? Between trustees and members of the plan? 
Is this flow of information adequate for you in order to do your job? Does it help or hinder 
you in any way? 
If you do not understand something, do you feel free to ask questions? If you need further 
information, do you feel free to request it? 
 
6. Since becoming a trustee have you received any formal training, orientation or other 
programmes/courses for union trustees? 
If yes: What type of programme was it and did you find it helpful?   
If you were to take more (or any) formal training to prepare you for this job what would it 
be? 
 
7. What are your responsibilities as a union trustee compared to the other trustees? 
Do you experience a conflict in your role as a union member and your role as a trustee?  Can 
you give some examples of times when you experienced this conflict and how you handled 
it? 
 
8. How would you characterize the relationship between union trustees and fund managers 
and/or pension fund staff?  
How would you characterize the relationship between employer trustees and fund managers 
and/or pension fund staff? 
Does your relationship with 1) your union and 2) your employer 3) pension staff and other 
trustees impact your ability to do your job as a trustee? 
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Does the union-management relationship at your workplace impact your ability to do your 
job as a trustee? 
 
9. Do you like doing your job as a pension board trustee?  Would you like to be re-appointed?   
How do you accommodate the demands of your trustee position with your regular job and/or 
your union work?   
Are there mechanisms that you use or things that you do to make your job as a trustee easier, 
more manageable, less conflicting, etc.? 
 
10. Based on your experience and knowledge of pension boards and trustees, how should 
pension funds go about selecting people to be union trustees? 
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Appendix 2: Profile of Interviewed Labor Trustees 
 
ID Gender Visible 
Minority 
Age Bracket 
(yrs) 
Tenure on 
Board (yrs) 
Fund 
Jurisdiction 
Fund Sector 
PTI01 M No 35-39 4-9 Ontario Public 
PTI02 M No 55-59 3 or less Ontario Public 
PTI03 M No 50-54 4-9 Atlantic Private 
PTI04 F No 55-59 3 or less National Public 
PTI05 M Yes 40-44 3 or less Western Public 
PTI06 M No 55-59 10 or more National Private 
PTI07 M No 45-49 4-9 Atlantic Private 
PTI08 M No 55-59 3 or less Western Public 
PTI09 M No 50-54 3 or less Atlantic Public 
PTI10 M No 35-39 3 or less Western Public 
PTI11 F No 50-54 3 or less Atlantic Public 
PTI12 M No 50-54 3 or less National Private 
PTI13 F No 55-59 4-9 Western Public 
PTI14 M No 40-44 4-9 Ontario Public 
PTI15 M No 35-39 3 or less Western Public 
PTI16 M No 45-49 3 or less Western Public 
PTI17 M Yes 45-49 4-9 Ontario Public 
PTI18 M No 50-54 10 or more Western Private 
PTI19 M No 55-59 10 or more Quebec Private 
PTI20 F No 50-54 4-9 Western Public 
 
